We solve the following two-person zero-sum game, introduced by Ruckle. Players I and II simultaneously choose sequences of m and n consecutive integers respectively from the integers 1 to p inclusive. The payoff to I is the number of integers in the intersection of the two sequences. A continuous version of this game is also solved as well as the variations in which one of the players need not choose his integers consecutively.
Introduction and summary
The book by W. H. Ruckle, [2] , contains a large number of geometric games and their applications, plus many unsolved problems. One of the unsolved games is called the "Number Hides Game" (NHG) and may be described as follows. The board, C, consists of the consecutive integers from 1 to p, C = {1,2,... ,p) . Player I (Red) chooses a subset, R, of m consecutive integers from C ; simultaneously, Player II (Blue) chooses a subset, B, of n consecutive integers from C. Then player II pays player I the number of elements in the intersection, R n B. This game is determined by the three integers, m, n , and p, where 1 < m < p , and 1 < n < p . The purpose of this paper is to present a solution to this game, denoted by G(m,n,p). This game is also described in [1] where it is called the "Number Search Game" (NSG), and a prize is offered for its solution. In these two references, certain special cases are solved.
follows. The value is 7/3 ; optimal for I is to choose the sequence {3,4,5,6,7} or {11,12,13,14,15} with probability 1/3 each or the sequence {4,5,6,7,8} or {10,11,12,13,14} with probability 1/6 each; optimal for II is to choose the sequence {1,2,3,4,5,6,7} or {11,12,13,14,15,16,17} with probability 1/3 each or the sequence {5,6,7,8,9,10,11} or {7,8,9,10,11,12,13} with probability 1/6 each.
In section 2, the notation is set and some preliminary propositions are proved. In Proposition 2, it is noted that the games G(m, n ,p) and G(n ,m,p-n + m) are closely related. They have the same value and optimal strategies in that one can easily be transformed into optimal strategies in the other. This allows us to restrict attention to the case where m> n . Proposition 3 is a simple extension of Theorem 1 to a more general case using the same type of proof as used by Ruckle. In section 3, the general case is solved completely. In section 4, we present a solution to the continuous version of this game, called the Interval Overlap Game in Ruckle [2] , and in doing so correct an error in the solution presented by Ruckle.
If both players are allowed to choose arbitrary sets of integers, m for player I and n for player II from the set C = {1, ... ,p}, the game is called the Simple Point Catcher Game (SPCG) and solved in [2] . The value of the game is mn/p, and player I (resp. II) has an optimal strategy of choosing the set of m (resp. n ) integers from C by simple random sampling (all subsets of m (resp. n ) integers from C are equally likely). In the final section, the number hides game, modified by allowing one of the players to choose an arbitrary set of m (or n ) integers, is solved and given an interpretation in terms of minesweeping or linear Salvo.
Notation and preliminary results
In the game G(m,n,p), I has p-m+l pure strategies and II has p-n + l pure strategies. We number I's pure strategies from 0 to p -m , where strategy i represents the choice 7? = {/' + 1, ... , i + m} . Similarly, IPs pure strategies are numbered from 0 to p-n , where strategy j represents the choice B = {j + 1, ... ,j+n}. The payoff matrix of the game is therefore a (p-m+l)x(p-n+l) matrix, A , with components a(i,j), i = 0, ... ,p -m , j = 0, ... ,p -n, of the following form.
For m > n , 0 if 0 < j < i -n,
For example, the matrices of the games (7(3,5,7) and C7(3,5,10) are: 
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A mixed strategy for I is a p-m+\ dimensional vector, say r = (r(0), r( 1 ), ... ,r(p -m)) with the understanding that r(i) represents the probability that I chooses pure strategy i, namely R -{i + I, ... ,i + m}. Similarly, a mixed strategy for II is a p -n + 1 dimensional vector, say b = (b(0), b( 1 ), ... ,b(pn)). Note that we start the numbering of these vectors as well as the matrix A at 0.
Our first task is to reduce the case m < n to the case m > n. First we identify the cases of m < n which have a saddle point, e.g. (7(3,5,7) above. Proposition 1. If m < n and m + p < 2n, then G(m ,n,p) has a saddle point with value m. Any strategy is optimal for II, and the central row (or rows if p -m is odd) is optimal for I.
Proof. The conditions m < n and m + p < 2n mean that n is so large that IPs choice is bound to contain the m central integers of the set C. a If we observe the matrix for C7(3,5,10), we see that the first two rows are dominated by the third, and the last two rows are dominated by the third from last. When these four rows are deleted, the matrix becomes identical to the matrix of the game G(5,3,8). This means that the games G(3,5,10) and 6(5, 3, 8) have the same value, and that any optimal strategy b for II in (7(3,5,10) is also optimal for II in (7(5,3,8) and conversely. Any strategy r optimal for I in (7(5,3,8) can be transformed into a strategy r' optimal for I in (7(3,5,10) by adding two zeros to the front and end of r, r' = (0,0, r(0), ... , r(3), 0,0). Conversely, given any strategy r optimal for I in (7(3,5,10), combining the first three components of r' into one and similarly the last three components gives a strategy r optimal in (7(5,3,8), T=(r'(0) + r'(l) + r,(2), r'(3), r'(4), r'(5) + r'(6) + r' (7)). This observation is expressed in terms of arbitrary m,n,p as follows.
Proposition 2. If m < n and m+p > 2n, then the games G(m,n,p) and G(n,m,p -n + m) are equivalent in the sense that the values are the same, player II 's optimal strategies are the same and any strategy optimal for I in G(n,m,p-n + m) is also optimal in G(m,n,p) if padded in front and at the end by n -m zeros. Proof. It is sufficient to check first that the top and bottom n-m rows of the game matrix for G(m,n,p) are dominated (by the next top or bottom row), and second that component a(i,j) of G(n ,m,p-n + m) from (2) is equal to the component a(i + n-m,j) of G(m,n,p) from (1). These computations are elementary and left to the reader. D
The implication of this result is rather surprising. For example, in playing the game (7(3,5,10) the players could pretend to be playing (7(5,3,8). Thus, I pretends that he is choosing a sequence of length 5 and that his opponent is choosing a sequence of length 3, provided that he also pretends that the board starts from the third integer.
We now assume that m > n. The next proposition also treats a special simple case. However, it generalizes Theorem 1 a great deal still using the same ideas in the proof.
Proposition 3. If m > n and p -Mm + x, where n < x < m, then the value of G(m,n,p) is n/(M + I). An optimal strategy for I is to choose one of the M + 1 intervals {1, ... ,m}, {m+l, ... ,2m}, ... ,{(M-\)m+ 1, ... ,Mm} and {p -m+ \, ... ,p} with probability l/(M + 1) each. An optimal strategy for II is to choose one of the M+l intervals {1,...,«}, {m + 1, ... , m + «},..., {Mm + 1, ... ,Mm + n} with probability l/(M + 1) each.
Proof. If I uses the suggested strategy, then each integer is covered with probability at least l/(M + 1), so the expected number of integers contained in any sequence of length n chosen by II is at least n/(M + 1 ). If II uses the suggested strategy, then any interval of length m chosen by I is bound to overlap exactly n of the integers receiving probability I/(M+l) from IPs strategy, so that the expected number of integers in the overlap is n/(M + I). D This result holds even if II is not restricted to choosing the n integers to be consecutive. In addition, if we write the suggested optimal strategies in their vector form as r or b, then both optimal strategies are independent of n (provided x > n). It is useful to state as a corollary the corresponding result for m < n . It may be proved using Proposition 2 or directly as in Proposition 3. Suppose that m and n are fixed with m> n . Then Proposition 3 gives the value of G(m ,n,p) for various values of p, namely, p = m , m+n <p< 2m , 2m + n < p < 3m, ... , and it is seen that the value is constant on each of these intervals. The main theorem below shows that the value is linear on each of the remaining closed intervals, m <p <m + n , 2m <p< 2m + n, ... .
The optimal strategy of both players can be expressed in terms of the proba- 
Moreover, q(m,p) is optimal for I and q(m,p + m -n) is optimal for II. Remarks. The case n < x < m is also covered in Proposition 3, but different optimal strategies are suggested for the players (except for player I when x = m , and for player II when x = n). However, one can show that the strategies proposed in Theorem 2 dominate those proposed in Proposition 3 (when they are different) in the sense that they never give a poorer expected return against any strategy of the opponent, and against some pure strategy of the opponent they give a strictly better return. In other words, the strategies of Theorem 2 are better suited to taking advantage of the opponent's mistakes.
As an example, let us solve the game (7(5,7,17). According to Proposition 3, (7(5,7,17) is equivalent to (7(7,5,15). From Theorem 2, since 15 = 2*7+1 (so M = 2 and x= 1), the value of (7(7,5,15) is (5*3-l)/(2*3) = 14/6 = 7/3 . Optimal for I is r = q(7,15) = (2,l,0,0,0,0,0,l,2)/6, and optimal for II is b = q(7,17) = (2,0,0,l,0,0,0,l,0,0,2)/6. Hence, (7(5,7,17) has the same value, 7/3, player II has the same optimal strategy, b, and player I has the optimal strategy, (0,0,r,0,0) = (0,0,2,l,0,0,0,0,0,l,2,0,0)/6. This is the value and optimal strategy for I found in [2] and mentioned in the introduction. However, the optimal strategy for II found there is b' = (2,0,0,0,l,0,l,0,0,0,2)/6. Both b and b' are optimal for II in both (7(7,5,15) and (7(5,7,17), but b dominates b' in (7(7,5,15) ; it takes better advantage of any mistake player I may make by giving any weight to pure strategies i = 3,4,5,6,7. In (7(5,7,17), neither b nor b' dominates the other; b' is better than b if I errs by using /' = 1,2,12 or 13, while the reverse is true if I errs by using 5,6,7,8 or 9.
We state as a corollary the result corresponding to the case m < n , using the results of Proposition 2. As with Theorem 2, the value is seen to be constant on the intervals of Corollary 1 and linear between them. Moreover, q(n ,p) is optimal for II and (0, q(w ,p -n + m), 0) is optimal for I, where 0 represents an n -m dimensional vector of zeros.
It is interesting to note that the player who chooses the larger interval has an optimal strategy that is independent of the length of the smaller interval. However, unlike for Proposition 3, the general results require that the player choosing the smaller interval be restricted to choosing consecutive integers.
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose that I uses q(m,p).
If p -Mm for some M > 1, then Proposition 3 implies that I is guaranteed a return of at least n/(M+ 1). If p = Mm + x with M > 1 and 0 < x < m , then the probability that square 5 is covered by the interval chosen by q(m,p) is:
License or copyright restrictions may apply to redistribution; see https://www.ams.org/journal-terms-of-use If II chooses an interval R of length n , the expected payoff to I is the sum of these probabilities for s in R. If n <x , the best II can do against this strategy is to choose R entirely within one of the intervals of type i), giving I an expected payoff of n/(M + 1). If n > x, the best II can do is to choose 7? spanning one of the intervals of type i) with an overlap of n -x into type ii), giving I an expected payoff of x/(M+ 1)
Now suppose that II uses q(m,p+m-n) in G(m,n,p) where p = Mm+x, 0 < x < m . We must distinguish several cases. Case 1. x = n. In this case p + m -n is divisible by m and the strategy q(m,p + m-n) has the form (3). This strategy gives weight 1/(M+1) to 5 in the intervals im+l<s<im + n for i = 0,1, ... ,M, and weight 0 to other s. For any choice by I of the interval 7? of length n , the sum of the weights is n/(M + 1), so this guarantees II an expected loss of n/(M + 1) as claimed.
to (M + 1 )n -x since it decreased 1 for n-x steps and increased 1 for n-x
The interval overlap game
The Interval Overlap Game is the continuous analog of the Number Hides Game. I and II simultaneously choose subintervals R and B of the interval [0,1] of fixed lengths a and ß respectively, and the payoff to I is the length of the intersection, Rf)B . The ideas developed in the previous sections carryover to this game and the reader should have little difficulty convincing himself that the following theorem holds. 18/120 which is greater than the value of the game. It can be seen that similar considerations apply for his analysis of the case a < ß by looking at the special case a = .39 and ß = .4.
Modified games
In this section, the rules of the game are changed to allow one of the players to choose an arbitrary set of integers not necessarily consecutive.
First, we suppose that player II is allowed to choose an arbitrary set of n integers from C, while player I is still restricted to choosing a set of m consecutive integers. The payoff is still the number of integers in the intersection of the chosen sets. Let us denote this game by Gx(m,n,p).
It will be seen that the strategy q(m ,p) still plays a role in the analysis.
In keeping with Ruckle's tradition of presenting applications, we give the following interpretation of this game. Player II is seeking to disrupt a busy channel of water having p shipping lanes and has mines which he can distribute in n of the lanes. Player I wants to keep the channel clear for shipping but his only resource is a minesweeper that can sweep just m consecutive lanes; he wins the number of mines that he finds. An analysis similar to the above can be carried out on the game G2(m,n,p), in which I is allowed to choose any m points in C while II is restricted to choosing n consecutive integers, the payoff again being the number of points in the intersection. We can think of G2(m,n,p) as the game of Salvo, or Battleship played on a line. Player II hides a battleship of length « on a line of length p vertices, and Player I chooses m spots for his salvo, winning the number of hits. We state the result without proof. Moreover, q(n,p) is optimal for II. Optimal for I is the following strategy. Let S = \Jj=x{s\(j -l)n + x + I < s < jn}. If m/N < n -x < n, choose all m points from S by simple random sampling. If 0 < n -x < m/N, choose the N(n -x) points of S, and choose the remaining m -N(n -x) points from C -S by simple random sampling.
